

Oil Geopolitics of Libya and Turkey

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Published: 30 August 2020

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ABSTRACT

One of the focal point of the world energy struggle in recent years causes a developing story in the Eastern Mediterranean area. Greece and Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) with the partnership of Egypt and Israel apply a containment strategy against Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the region. Turkey's response to the plan was exclusive agreement with Libya. Turkey and Libya have signed a memorandum of understanding between the National Reconciliation Government on the restriction of the Marine Jurisdiction of the new continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean - sole economic zone boundaries of the draw. Greece could do with other countries and Turkey's jurisdiction in front of the agreements that may restrict the movement area said to pass. US and European Union (EU) against Turkey, Israel and the GCA also had some side following the gas partnership with European countries. This article focused on the ongoing competition of Libya, considering the oil geopolitics of Libya and the disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Keywords: Libya, Turkey, Eastern Mediterranean, Oil, Greece.

INTRODUCTION

In 1551 Tripoli, first established by the Phonicians in the 7th century BC, was captured by the Ottomans by Turgut Reis and chief admiral Sinan Pasha as a result of their naval actions. In 1911-1912, the area came under Italian influence, then in 1942, the French and British influence. The territory of Cyrenaica on the east and Tripoli belonged to the British, when the French took over Fezzan.

With Libya, the Gaddafi's rule was also another aspect. SonerYalcin's opinion published in Turkish Sözcü in January 15, 2020 resumes the era as such: "This is a fairly pacific coup d'état, and a declaration of the constitution of the Libyan Arab Republic, which was made in the context of the Free Officer Movement led by Muammar Qaddafi who took the opportunity of King Idris (who had support from the West) on his vacation in Turkey. The new government's first executive policy was to nationalize all the British and Italian petroleum reserves in the region. The revolution had made promises of democracy and capitalism and unification (Sanseverino, 2014).

It was nine years after the Libyan revolt and the end of Muammar Gaddafi's reign that the world could not achieve the peace and wealth the citizens desired due to battling the one nation's population from different ends. The crisis that escalated foreign interference worsened until it entered Libya, where major powers struggle to accept the internal party compromises without any of them taking an interest in the Libyan people's welfare.

On the basis of what we have learned, we see that the petroleum fields are viewed as one of the key causes of dispute contesting these national forces, and oil is the main revenue stream of the country. It is 95% of Libya's production, since the start of the war. The continued dispute over Libya's savings and other compromises would have a detrimental effect on the economy and the citizens, particularly when most of those powers clearly have oil and power over the sovereign decision of the world, far from the Libyans.

The focal point of the world energy struggle in recent years is the sources of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's response to the plan was the exclusive agreement with Libya, Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Greece and Turkey in the region. Turkey and Libya signed the memorandum of understanding with the National Reconciliation Government on the restriction of the Marine Jurisdiction of the new continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean - exclusive of the economic zone boundaries of the draw, Greece could do with other countries and Turkey's jurisdiction ahead of the agreements may restrict the movement area that is said to pass.

After 2009, when the search for energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean accelerated, searches for alliances in the region increased. In 2011, after the discovery of natural gas fields of Israel, Turkey was left out of the deal while establishing a partnership between Israel and GCA..

Following the introduction of Europe in the region, the natural gas exploration activities started by making agreements with European companies and US ExxonMobil companies GKRY.

Developments on the action to protect the rights of Turkey in the region and its drilling vessels by activating Fatih Yavuz, has accelerated its drilling activities. Exploration activities on the continental shelf of the GASC Turkey and Greece, became uncomfortable as there was much tension harassment.

Countries led by the Cyprus Russian Section in the Eastern Mediterranean established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum to formalize their partnership. Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Palestine and platforms which were established by the common goal of Egypt's gas market, Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon and Libya were created without.

If Turkey had continued its exploration activities on her own, this would increase the tension with GCA. Turkey started natural gas drilling around Cyprus and GCA complained to the United Nations. U.S. and European Union (EU) against Turkey, Israel and the GCA also had some side following the gas partnership with European countries. If Turkey were to take a step back in

the process, warships would be sent to the region which would continue to stand next to the search ships.

While BarbarosHayreddin Pasha continued to work with the seismic research ship and the Fatih sounding ship near Cyprus, the Navy was also vigilant against possible harassment or assault attempts to be carried out on these ships.

This article is focused on the oil geopolitics of Libya, taking into considerations the recent political and military developments both in Libya and Eastern Mediterranean region. In addition, this study would address the relationships between Turkey and Libya, and between Libya and the external powers. Agreement on the Turkey and Libya agreement for the boundaries of EEZ would be another critical part of the article to better understand possible future of the relationships. In that case, we would assess how the ongoing conflict may affect relationships with Turkey.

ENERGY SOURCES OF LIBYA

In the large region, more than three million km² of which urbanization accounts for just 5%, and the low population, 6 million citizens searching for new towns for accommodation, work and development, the energy value of the State of Libya is greater. And all these requirements have been met by the reality. While Libya is a productive energy country, particularly traditional sources of energy (oil and gas), demand is on the rise every day, and, most importantly, Libya exports crude oil without refining and imports the majority of its derivatives because of the investment and services in the Libyans require huge financial returns. Thus, electricity has been turned into a Libya issue with a plethora of challenges and issues (Baltrop, 2019).

Petroleum fields are considered one of the main conflicts disputed by these regional powers and oil is the country's major revenue source, which accounts for 95% of Libya's export revenues before the outbreak of the Libyan revolution. Libya has 48.4 billion barrels of oil reserves, making up 2.8% of the world's total. They have 1.4 trillion cubic meters of their natural gas reserves. Libya produced up to 3 million barrels of crude oil back in the 1970s. In the 1990s, the number decreased to 1.5 million barrels. The causes for this decline have been both the nationalization of the oil industries and the reactions to this strategy, and the economic blockade placed by the West, under the excuse of terror, according to the Oxford Institute of Energy. Just after Gaddafi acknowledged Libya's role in the Lockerbie bombing and agreed to compensate those who have lost the lives of those embargos (Escribano, 2010).

Crescent oil-growing region – comprising many cities from Benghazi to Sirte-the largest oil stock and the Sidra, Ras, Lanouff as well as the biggest ports in Libya, where the Crescent region in Libya normally exports approximately 800,000 b/d from about 1.5 million d/d. The region is located 500 km to the East of Libya, which is also a gateway between Benghazi and Tripoli.

Those countries in conflict are working for their customers to acquire Libyan oil. Currently, Libya is generating more than 1.05 million barrels of oil a day and expects to increase it and to return to pre-2011 peaks, where it had produced around 1.6 million barrels a day, although this erratic volume, in line with the safety condition, has dropped over 200,000 barrels a few times, but has risen to 400,000,000 barrels a day a little later (EIA, 2012). The key advantage of Libyan crude is the quality of its deposits and its access to export ports. The confirmed crude oil reserves in Libya are projected to contribute 46.42 trillion barrels (approximately 3.94% of global reserves) and 6.36% of Arab Organization supply, according to 2010 figures (EIA, 2012).

The coasts of Libya include Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Niger, Chad, and Sudan, which are close to the Mediterranean region. After Sudan, Algeria and Congo in Africa, Libya has the highest surface area. Libya has more than 6 million inhabitants. Libya has lucrative oil, thanks to its good production and small mining prices as well as 40% of Africa's vast deposits of coal.

EXCLUDING OIL RESOURCES, THE INTENTION OF AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS

The NOC is the main body that supervise the oil and gas industry in Libya. However, since Libya currently has two major competing groups (first led by the Sarrac government of the national agreement and HalifaHafter's National Army) which claimed to rule the region. The NOC aimed to combine these forces and to retain an independent status. However, it really appears to be a very difficult goal if not impossible to achieve. The Tobruk-based LNA management, for example, tried to create its own NOC in 2015. In 2016-2018, LNA and Tripoli based GNA repeatedly controlled the Sirte Gulf Export Terminals. There is also local militia or Petroleum Facilities Guards (PFG,) which attempt to maintain control of oil production, pipelines and export terminals along with LNA and GNA. For this reason, it is more complicated (Jebali, 2017).

The NOC was responsible for the exploration and sharing agreements during the Gaddafi period. "The Oasis Group of American oil firms (Amerada Hess, Conoco and the Marathon) held the agreements and assets of NOC from 1986 to 2005 (Ref??). However, the United States' sanctions and non-Gaddafi's administration were not allowed to operate in Libya. In the early 2000, Qaddafi fostered new explorations and tendering deals to invest in Libya's hydrocarbon industry to include upcoming firms such as CNPC, ONGC (India), Petrobras (Brazil), Statoil (Norway) and Woodside Petroleum agreements.

Currently in the framework of the profit-sharing arrangement, oil extracted in Libya is shared between NOC and the international oil firms. ENI, Italy's most successful international business since 1959, raised about 302,000 barrels averaged daily in 2018. The organization owns five onshore and two offshore licenses and usually retains 50% of its JVA agreements with the NOC.

TOTAL of France, which has worked in Libya since 1950, is also a leading player. TOTAL is responsible for a 75% interest in the offshore Al Jurf (on the Libyan/Tunisian border) license area and 16.33% interest in the field of voting, which it had acquired from the Marathon Oil Company. Conoco is another Waha owner and the remaining shares are part of the NOC. Other fields of TOTAL ownership include: El Sharara (onshore; 30% share), Murzuk Basin (Blocks: 130/131; 24%).

The heightened tension in the area currently leaves little space for intervention in Mabruk. Other oil companies are: Repsol (Spain), the OMV (Austria) in Libya, each of which produces around 250,000 barrels per day. Equinor (Norway) and Rosneft (Russia), Gazprom (Russia), Wintershall (Germany), Harogue (Veba Oil), and West and Petro-Canada are the others with lower demand.

Each endeavor to describe the current situation as the 'civil war' is merely declaring ignorance on the role and potential of Libya in global hydrocarbon production, or worse, to ignore the true players (puppeteers).

To take the flow of water, a large fossil-water reserve underlying Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Chad formed the subterranean water level. Opportunities provided by this reserve include millions

of cubic meters of water extracted from 1300 wells over 1600 km from the desert to coastal towns and transported by built aqueducts, then producing the wilderness. The Libyan State has suggested it (EIA, 2014).

According to a local official and Libyan oil source, after the expiration of the protests blocking piping, Libyan oilfield of Sharara 300,000 barrels a day and El Feel oilfield of 90,000 bpd started up once again.

The largest oil export port of the world, Sidra, was targeted by the Militia forces between December 2014 and January 2016. These attacks severely affected the country's oil production and export. The population of Libya was very troubled by the militia's ability to manufacture and manage oil.

When we arrived in March 2017, the head of the Libyan National Army, General Khalifa Haftar, returned from Benghazi Defense Brigade in Benghazi, from Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil ports that have 60% Libyan export capacity.

Libya's crude output exceeded 491,000 bpd on Thursday, but OPEC's goal was 800,000 bpd, and by August it was one million bpd, said NOC, the president of the state oil company in Paris at a conference in Paris. The OPEC's target was around 800, 000 bpd.

In total, Libya has proven to have 42 billion barrels of crude oil and 1505 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. The oil production of 1, 700,000 barrels per day declined to 700,000 barrels after the crisis, before the crises that started after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in this country.

Libya also owns Africa's fourth biggest gas deposit. It constitutes 0.8% of the global gas demand, with an average production of approximately 590 billion cubic meters. The development of Libya's natural gas became increasingly important for European countries after the construction of the Green stream pipeline. The following major contracts in Libya have been awarded to French Total, British BP, Lasmo, Exxon Mobil, the Italian ENI group (UK Occidental, Russo Rosneft). The country's revenue is 80% and is generated from oil exports only.

Around 1.6 million barrels of oil were produced every day in Libya. Conflicts with the revolution almost halted all exports in the country. As the economy of the world is based on oil exports, the revolution's economic collapse disrupted the domestic balance of payment and generated a job deficit.

Libya's crude oil output has been in excess of 760,000 barrels a day for the first time since December 2014 (bpd). The high of three years has been driven mainly by the reopening of the El Sharara and the Elephant fields of the Murzuq Basin, which have an estimated output of around 280,000 bpd. With this latest output boost, many analysts also question if a more steady and reliable supply cycle is on the brink of Libya's crude oil industry or if this latest development is just another false beginning for the unstable North African country.

FOREIGN COMPETITION ON THE ENERGY SOURCES OF LIBYA

The strategic importance of Libya for Europe's countries, particularly France, Italy, Great Britain and Germany, the countries which operate under the oil industry and Libya as a transit region between Europe and Africa has emerged since Libya was discovered. This means that all Europe's supplies and 60% of all African products are shipped to Libya and to other North African countries, making stabilization a vital issue here.

The dynamics and strategic relationships of the energy generation in Libya could be understood by focusing on three main concerns: The first concern is the North and Central Africa's European competition and its energy resources. Secondly, what is known as the Atlantic Strategy, which is a complex strategy that prevents Russia's presence in North Africa, seeks to reduce its reliance on Russia's sources of energy, making North Africa or the Eastern Mediterranean an appropriate alternative to it, and thus the recurrence of the Cold War or European conflict — normally Eastern Europe. Thirdly, the gas problem in the Eastern Mediterranean and how new complexities could be generated in the Libyan dispute particularly after a joint protection and maritime agreement has been signed by Libya and Turkey (United Nations, 1987).

In the international context of what has occurred in Libya and its impact on oil companies, certain publications could be followed up during the revolutionary period on the factors that have driven some countries to speed up Gaddafi's overthrow and the importance of decision makers in European countries for their companies in the Libyan context. In this communication, I have published an article explaining France's competition with Britain and its attempt to isolate Germany from the announcement during the February 2011 revolution campaign by the Security Council against Gaddafi regime.

Each invasion party wanted to strengthen its industries and role in the Libyan market, and the British Prime Minister David Cameron was dismissive of halting the Libyan war while France came first, and the Forbes report suggested that the efforts to weaken Germany and Wenthal and her organization were made after the Libyan revolt.

Italy might have been one of the largest importers of Libyan oil and gas in particular, so it did not want to overthrow Qaddafi at first, thus Gaddafi was important for France, because he wanted to create acceptable deals with every Western group, not least.

In Libya, Italy has the biggest petroleum firm, Eni, which has collaborated with the national oil companies Mellitah and is involved in the Murzuk region and the Abu Tufail fields in the Elephant sector, with long-term gas supply contracts in Italy. Italy has the only operational company in Libya. But some officials in Italy seemingly think Libya is important not only for gas and oil, but for a major transformation taking place in North Africa as he mentioned the importance that Libya and the region have in connecting all parts of the world in the Italian minister of foreign affairs' paper.

France and its African eyes recognize Libya's importance and work towards advancing its interest, particularly in the production of uranium, gas and oil. In order to promote the building of good relationship with France, since Gaddafi's signature in 2007 with President Sarkozy on the construction of a nuclear reactor in Southern Libya made Iran and China, in particular, Gaddafi stone, in support of the Sudanese secession of South Sudan. The first was Gaddafi's agreement. France seeks uranium in Niger which provides France with approximately one-third of its nuclear energy-dependent electricity production. Consequently, France sought to strengthen its presence in Libya after the revolution.

France was not in agreement with Gaddafi concerning the 4,401 km-long gas road from Nigeria to Algeria. This could harm Libya's oil production and export. France is also aiming to strengthen its influence in Africa and safeguard its products' export methods. This still has a lot of capital in its business transactions with Europe and often France with certain African nations.

The size of interfering experience of the global economy and the linkage of roads and the multiplicity of opportunities in Africa, together with other risks are recognized by Britain,

Germany, China and Russia which make the Libyan crisis important to them, together with the anticipated opportunities in liquefied gas and alternative energy.

NATO's strategy could be understood to prevent Russian Federation presence and to limit its presence in the Mediterranean Sea in North African region. Russia, in particular Europe, is one of the largest gas exporting countries. This has constantly put pressure on European countries which have not been very friendly to Russia (Capasso, 2019).

The division that Libyan parties support first, as well as the conflict over the region of North Africa and the possibility of transferring the opportunities in Libya and Algeria (one of the biggest oil and gas exporters in Africa-to Libya) is the cause of the dispute between the European countries. Libya also has liquefied gas in quantities, so Europe's energy dependency from North Africa is not borne by Russia's political and economic cost to pressure Europe.

Following numerous media outlets reporting attempts to interfere with Russia in Libya from the USA, the USA and European countries looked for a political solution to the Libyan crisis. The US has taken this very seriously and made numerous visits to Libyan parties to reach a rapid solution to the crisis, as they seek to end the war in Libya and to pressure the successor of Haftar who launched an assault against Tripoli, the capital of Libya.

Thus, the world undergoing an energy revolution, beginning with liquefied gas for alternative energy sources, has opened paths for non-EU nations. Europe considers this a suitable alternative that keeps them from the specter of dependence on Russia's energy, as well as its high political costs.

The occupying force of Israel was one of these programs. Since the 1990's, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Israeli businesses have begun exploration and the result was a large quantity of gas from Arab countries— Greece and Cyprus-related basins. Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy and Jordan are the short-recorded political barriers of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Palestine established the Block Committee. This block brought tension and a return to the frontier problem of former conflicts in countries including Jordan and the occupying power, as well as Lebanon, Northern Turkey and the Greek Republic. This block has excluded Turkish Cyprus and was indifferent to the rights of Turkey in the region, and the conflict has begun here. But what is Libya's relationship to all these? (Tziarras, 2019).

TURKEY AND LIBYA AGREEMENT FOR THE BOUNDARIES OF EEZ AND ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE

With the discovery of energy resources, the Eastern Mediterranean has become a critical area of struggle, not only in terms of control of the Mediterranean trade routes, but also on energy. The energy factor changed the geopolitical importance of the Eastern Mediterranean and caused not only the riparians but also the international actors and companies to become interested in the region. As the number of actors wishing to establish influence over the region increases, the issue becomes more and more complex in the Eastern Mediterranean. For this reason, the Eastern Mediterranean and energy connection Cyprus has become an issue that has an impact and is evaluated within the framework of energy security and international law (Constantini, 2017).

Turkey's Libya agreement that came with seal on the limitation of jurisdiction has signed the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical agenda as a move that could change drastically. Both the United Nations as well as the state of the region ahead of the consensus identified the signed jurisdiction between Turkey and the Libyan National Reconciliation Government recognized only

by Turkey, has a nature to change the entire balance in the region, this agreement is important to summarize and understand that. Agreement between Turkey and the Mediterranean that took place in Libya has formally draw the boundaries between them. Accordingly, the Marmaris-Fethiye-Kaş shore line and the Derne-Tobruk as well as the Bordiya shore line of Libya are neighbors. The western most line connecting this line passes a few nautical miles from Crete Island. Line drawn by agreement between Libya and Turkey, because it is almost over Crete now, Greece overlaps with the territory. With the agreement on the limitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean signed between Turkey and Libya, Greece is a shield that will occur between Cyprus and Egypt.

The Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Pipeline created between Greece, Cyprus and Israel - the East Med project is Europe with a pipeline to be laid under the sea from Cyprus to the Island of Crete and from the Peloponnese of Greece to the Eastern Mediterranean envisaged delivery. The length of the line is 900,000 km. 200 km of this would be from the Leviathan region of Israel to Southern Cyprus, 700 km from Cyprus to Crete and 400 km from Crete to Greece. The East Med project, which is estimated to cost 7 billion Euros in the first phase, is supported by the USA and the EU.

When evaluation was done from the point of view of Cyprus, the issue was a new link of the deadlock, especially due to the repeated irreconcilable attitudes of the Greek Cypriot Administration. The Eastern Mediterranean and energy connections, the EU and the energy needs of some countries especially Turkey in the region were found, when some of the market searches seems to have been formulated considering the different external policies of the parties. In other words, the region has a special feature both in terms of energy supply security and energy trade and it is a new energy geopolitical center. From the point of view of the international law on the Eastern Mediterranean issue, the desire of to have most of the resources by the regional and international actors who are interested in the region's energy resources was obvious.

In this context, the recent Association for Energy Economics in Turkey, Middle East Technical University (METU) in partnership with the "First East Mediterranean International Energy Symposium" was held. In this symposium, North Cyprus Turkish Republic (NCTR) Economy and Energy Minister Hassan Taçoy brought a project agenda for the establishment of a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and the TRNC, 2025. TRNC natural gas from Turkey pipeline had said the line could be specified to start transporting gas in 2025, which could be done parallel to the water line between the TRNC and Turkey and is said to be 80 km long; The most important feature of the natural gas pipeline in addition to transport gas from Turkey to the TRNC, is bidirectional (Constantini, 2018).

In the delimitation of the maritime zones coastal geography, structure played an important role. It is the determining factor more often than not, and is built on two fundamental principles: 'The principle of land mastery of the sea' and 'the coastal state shall lay down this domination via its coastal borders.' In all relevant judgments (Malta-Libya situation, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf situation, Guinea-Bissau case), this basic theory has been illustrated.

The question of maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean has particular aspects, which needed to be taken into consideration when the boundaries were established. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) proposes that maritime resources be distributed fairly and legally and maritime zone boundaries be limited. Although the geopolitical circumstances in the area were at the root of the EEZ conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, the

actions carried out by nations were in fact opposed to the convention's basic values, such as 'freedom,' 'non-infringement,' and 'gender-equitable territorial distribution.' Articles 55-57 of Part V of the UNCLOS 1982 provided for the international legal system of EEZs. Under Article 57 of the Convention: "The exclusive economic region shall not be expanded beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines which calculate the width of the territorial sea." The EEZ boundary could only be decided through the agreement between several countries and in addition, the islands, as a consequence of their distance of less than 400 nautical miles from each country (United Nations, 1982).

The biggest contribution to the settlement has been the fact that, since the agreement reached with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean with a Riberean regime, the arrangement also involved the redecoration of the boundaries between an exclusive economic zone and the coastal shelter region within the Eastern Mediterranean since it constitutes the second maritime boundary agreement.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya, Fayiz es-Serrag, concluded the Turkish-Libya Maritime Border Delimitation Deal on 27 November. Turkey took a game-changing initiative with the Libya agreement, which has a historic impact on the Eastern Mediterranean energy geopolitics. The idea that Turkey could not reach an arrangement with another nation in the area is also incorrect and doors are now opened with the Libyan deal to new deals with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel (Østhagen, 2019).

It would not be unconstitutional for Greece to offer only the coastal areas near Turkey under the no-infringement concept. Turkey reached a historic victory by entering the so-called exclusive economic area in the western direction, which seriously violated the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Anatolian coast of the 533-nautical-mile East Mediterranean. The third crucial accomplishment, owing to Turkish geographical location in the world chart, has been the creation of Libya as a Turkish sailing neighbor and vice versa, by means of the concept of building diagonal lines. In the future, Libya would be a riparian state with Turkey as areas such as Fethiye and surrounding areas are totally matched by the Eastern Libyan towns such as Derna. This is not the case in the country. The International Law of 1982 known as UNCLOS gives countries such as Turkey and Libya the freedom to sign an agreement in November 2019 by Libya and Turkey. It includes a safety and maritime agreement memorandum which helps Turkey to demarcate its maritime borders and prevents Egypt and Greece from monopolizing the Eastern Mediterranean region (Østhagen, 2019).

Greek islands such as Crete are perceived by Greece to be intercepted at the beach between Libya and Turkey, and that it does not have a right to do so. The agreement, of course, has not yet been made public. But it confirms the active aspect of energy in the crisis of Libya, as Egypt and Greece have not mentioned Libya or as far as the maritime borders are concerned. But it casts a shadow over an endless support for the Haftar man succeeding who, without taking peer measures between Libya and Egypt, appears to guarantee Egypt control of the marine waters of Libya.

This was what Greece did, as well as use Libya to introduce the Israel-based project aimed at supplying Europe with gas from Israel, Cyprus, and Lebanon through Crete and Europe. This expert project is a very complex idea due to its high costs and the existence of alternative products that go through Turkey and have existing facilities, compared to the high gas prices from Russian. This project has been prepared by the experts.

As for Egypt, they rejected the agreement and kept the Skhirat agreement that was not the case of Egypt but the statement that Egypt made did not lead to terms of an agreement that stipulated in its preamble that the government and people should be covered and that these values should be the purpose of the revolution of February 17. The ruler who violated Egypt violated Libya's sovereignty on several occasions, attacked and interfered its own internal businesses, supported one party at the expense of another, violated the law on arms embargo, sent Egyptian military personnel to Libya and embraced all who wanted to conspire supporters of the old regime against Libya. This does not give Egypt the right to interfere with the internationally recognized government's agreements (Boustros, 2018).

But what if the region was transformed in the Eastern Mediterranean and settled Libya, would 2.8 trillion cubic meters of liquefied gas be available?

In accordance with the "no-encroachment" principle, only marine regions close to Turkey's coasts (which are the longest in the Eastern Mediterranean) should be illegally granted to Greece. Turkey has won a historic victory under the Libya agreement, penetrating the so-called exclusive economic zone, which seriously infringed the rights of the Turkish North Cyprus Republic and the Anatolian 533-nautical-mile coast, in the western direction of the Eastern Mediterranean. The second most significant achievement is the development of Libya as a Turkish sea neighbor, vice versa, on the basis of Turkish oblique geographical position on the world map, through the "diagonal line creation" principles.

In the future, Turkey (not Greece) will have the opportunity to conclude similar agreements with Egypt and Israel. As areas like Fethiye and its environs, Libya is a riparian state with Turkey, Libya's eastern cities, like Derna, are completely identical. The International Law of 1982 known as UNCLOS gives countries such as Turkey and Libya the freedom to sign an agreement that was signed in November, 2019 by Libya and Turkey. It includes a protection and maritime agreement memorandum which allows Turkey to demarcate its maritime borders and prevents Egypt and Greece from monopolizing the Eastern Mediterranean region (TRT World News, 2019).

Greece perceived that the Greek islands such as Crete obstruct the Libyan-Turkish beach for its part and of course, does not perceive, that Turkey is able to do so, as the deal has not yet been made official. It confirms, however, that energy in the Libyan crisis has an active dimension. As soon as Egypt and Greece have not mentioned Libya, or as far as the sea border is concerned, this casts a shadow over the continued support to Haftar's successor, who seems to guarantee Egypt's control of Libya's marine waters without taking pairs between Libya and Egypt.

Greece is also doing this, because it uses the difficult situation in Libya to implement the Israeli project which aimed to supply Europe with gas from Israel, Cyprus, Lebanon, through Crete and Europe. This expert project is a very complex idea due to its high costs and the existence of alternative products that go through Turkey and have existing facilities, with gas prices being high for Russian gas. This project has been prepared by the experts (World Bank. 2010).

As for Egypt, it rejected the agreement and kept the Skhirat Agreement that was not the case of Egypt, but the statement that Egypt made did not lead to terms of an agreement that stipulated in its preamble that the government and people should be covered and that these values should be the purpose of the revolution of February, 17. The ruler who violated Egypt violated Libya 's sovereignty on several occasions, attacked and interfered in its own internal businesses, supported one party at the expense of another, violated the law on arms embargo, sent Egyptian military personnel to Libya and embraced all who wanted to conspire supporters of the old regime against

Libya. This does not give Egypt the right to interfere with the internationally recognized government's agreements (Elghawi, 2015).

But what if this region in the Eastern Mediterranean were changed and Libya was settled, would 2.8 trillion cubic meters of liquefied gas come?

Because most of the basins were not identified yet, in North Africa, the warm waters would be full of energy and liquefied gas from Egypt, Libya, and Algeria. All these countries would be able to come up with a development-understanding formula, but the prevailing thing at the time is conflict and trying to make use of the crisis in Libya in order to bring temporary benefits at the expense of the future.

HOW ONGOING CONFLICT MAY EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

Turkish effect on the political scene in Libya is undoubtedly what we now consider a tangible reality. Some countries that refuse to sign the Turkish-Libyan Agreement would respond with the support of Haftar for reconciliation against the government. Therefore, the political and military scene keeps on escalating and developing.

Moreover, Libya would have joined a turbulent scene in the Eastern Mediterranean with the signature of the Libyan-Turkish Memorandum of Understanding and become a major and important party in conflict between oil and gas countries across the region. Egypt, Greek Cyprus, and Israel are going to face Libya. This is confirmed by the strong reactions on the refusal to sign the memorandum of understanding between Libya and Turkey.

Like the danger faced by Egypt, Greece cannot present a significant challenge to Libya. While the Libyan-Turkish Memorandum of Understanding was battering its teeth and firmly declining to register, elsewhere on geopolitical charts in the Eastern Mediterranean, is the main source of danger. It is Israel that is not satisfied with the signing of the LTM, and this may not be attributable to the failure of its project to transfer gas to Europe after the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between Libya and Turkey (Başpınar, 2017).

Turkey's relationship with the people of Libya are deeply rooted. Turkey places great importance on the security and welfare of the Libyan people because of its historical and cultural links. After the 17 February 2011 revolution, Turkey's favorable attitudes towards Libya before and after the Revolution also mostly encompassed economic ties at the time of the overthrow of Gaddafi, who ruled Libya between 1969 and 2011 (Öztaş, 2019).

Turkey has contributed to the efforts of institution building in Libya, particularly in the areas of protection and economic development, in line with the urgent priorities of Libya. As a consequence of the deteriorating security situation in the region, assistance programs led by Turkey were halted in 2014.

Throughout 2015, Turkey has actively supported the UN-facilitated Libyan political dialog process. Turkey has participated in a mutually beneficial deal with all the players in Libya to allow them participate in the diplomatic phase. Turkey has closely observed political dialog participants 'meetings and hosted several Libyan stakeholders' meetings.

Turkey welcomed the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement on 17 December 2015, providing a clear framework for long-term peace and stability. The ceremony of signing took place in Skhirat, Morocco and was attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mr. Cavusoglu. In trying to effectively implement the Libyan political agreement, Turkey supports the Government of the National Accord. Turkey would resume aid programs in coordination with the

Government of the National Agreement through close cooperation with the new Libyan authorities, on the ground, in view of the security situation as soon as possible (Butler, 2019).

Turkey sent a letter to the UN in March 18, 2019 the limits of the continental shelf in the Mediterranean 32 degrees, 16 min, 18 sec set in the East of the meridian between the meridian of 28 degrees west. The boundaries of the continental shelf in the midline of Turkey's maritime jurisdiction areas of Turkey with Egypt was also noted (Colombo, 2014).

After overcoming the problems, there were three options on the agenda for the marketing of the resources. The first is through using the Mediterranean pipelines in Turkey to reach the European market, secondly, removal of the transferor to Turkey with a new pipeline that transport to Greece, extending to Egypt as the third. The cost of the project in the scenario that was considered was the most appropriate transfers made through Turkey. However, this project is in front of the biggest obstacles, Exclusive Economic Zone of the conflict between Turkey and Cyprus, and must be connected with the conclusion of the US-Israeli objections to the presence of oil companies (Shaffer, 2011).

The Mediterranean region is vital for both the countries of the region and the world. Given the advantages of its strategic location and its relationship to economic, security and political interests, then the security of this region and the conflict in it are not limited to their countries only, but include international powers, which drives developments towards two contradictory scenarios, but their opportunities are close; They are escalation or cooperation (Constantini, 2016).

The first scenario: the agreement increased the pace of conflict

The panorama hopes that, in consideration of the importance of the region's geographical and historical aspect as well as its diversity and strength, the Turkish-Libyan agreement would contribute to the demarcation of the joint sea boundary, as would the military security cooperation agreement. The deterioration could therefore be between economic and political penalties and military skirmishes and an escalated effort to overthrow the Al-Wefaq government by occupying the Libyan capital which would cancel the deal with Turkey.

This scenario supports the significant gaps in the strategies of the Eastern Mediterranean countries, the apprehension of the impacts of findings and effects of unilateral oil discovery, and the recovery of the productivity of the potential position of Turkey in the wake of and outside naval, military and economic capacities in general-as well as Libya.

This scenario is viewed with limited escalation in the short term more definitely, while the second scenario option is in the medium term.

The second scenario: the agreement may push countries to cooperate

This scenario is focused on the premise that the Eastern Mediterranean countries are in danger of their stability and the protection of the region, which is crucial to the countries of the world; as far as commerce, transport and energy flows are concerned, this scenario anticipates that the agreement would be rapid in the medium- term under foreign strain.

This reinforces Turkish officials' statements, their limited response to Turkey, and the possibility of escalation and confrontation could cause a complete chaos not to be served by any country.

Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, the nearest regions such as Greece, as well as US and bargaining issue, including global actors such as Russia, are enough to make an international problem. In addition to France, Italy and England through multinational energy companies such as Total, BP, ENI. China, which shows the

importance it attaches to the Mediterranean Ports with the “One Generation One Road” project and wants to have a say in the energy market in the Middle East, is also very close to the subject.

The result of the importance of the region as it represents the aspirations of many global actors in the Eastern Mediterranean feeding makes it impossible to talk about one issue. Some plots, defined as the Exclusive Economic Zone, intersect with each other, making it an issue that more than one actor should seat at the table and solve. But first of all, the conflicts that threaten the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, a very tense region, must be terminated.

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Who are entitled to claim legal framework in the Eastern Mediterranean in the recent tense relationships between Turkey and countries in the region, which also creates quite a negative situation. Particularly, the difficulties experienced in the diplomatic field with Israel and Egypt prevent the parties from coming together and striving for business partnerships in the long term. Also found is an important place in the Eastern Mediterranean equations with the participation of actors such as the United States and Greece. Turkey is a country that ignores reveals the groups on this issue.

Ankara's attitude towards this issue is very clear. High-tech in the Eastern Mediterranean three drill ship with energy quest for the ongoing Turkey, Israel and South Cyprus protest of the exploration activities in the region where there is legal rights and Turkey shows that it would not accept any scenario that is not in the meanwhile, Turkey's biggest drawback. is here alone. Therefore, it would be an important leverage to strengthen the bargain by engaging global actors with whom he has common interests.

CONCLUSION

Energy is relevant in the sense of the Libyan crisis between the opposing parties in Libya, regionally and the global climate of geoenergy. Libya, with its four basins, the Sirte Basin being the most important one, cooperates with several international companies from Italy, Germany, France, Spain and the Gulf countries.

Turkey, which is in the process from the sea littoral agreement with the Libyan National Reconciliation Government. Turkey and the Libyan National Reconciliation Government signed the Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Restriction of the Marine Jurisdiction between the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) and Greece duo of Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, and by establishing the tripartite cooperation mechanisms with countries such as Jordan or "East Mediterranean Gas Forum", Turkey was a response to the formation of the exclusion and left alone policy in the Mediterranean. The agreement, which was later supported by military cooperation with the National Consensus Government, also determined the new continental shelf - the exclusive economic zone borders in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The agreement between Turkey and Libya, Greece and Egypt in the future could be noted with the GCA that precede the agreement to limit the jurisdiction of the sea.

It is emphasized that if Greece adopts the area extending from Crete to Meis as the only coastline, and the Egyptian maritime agreement with GASC, Turkish territorial waters could be reduced to a limited area and this possibility is prevented by the Libyan step.

The agreement with Libya is the second similarly qualified agreement in the Eastern Mediterranean following the continental shelf agreement with the TRNC in 2011. Greece, which is one of the countries that reacted the most harshly to the agreement, claims that the islands it has are not taken into consideration in the continental shelf account.

It also sells oil to many nations, of which Italy and Germany are the major ones. At the same time, however, uranium and natural gas from Africa are significant crossroads, which have enabled a country like France to interfere strongly in the Libyan relationships. In North Africa, the EU also provides an option to diversify the electricity market and increasing Russian gas dependence.

The domestic war in Libya has increasingly become a global dispute and it seems that despite news of the Russian involvement in Libya, it would transform into an international crisis. As energy-consuming companies play the role of lobbying all countries to solve the Libya crisis, the conflict's dynamics become more complex.

Russia do not consider the continuation of the conflict in Libya as wrong, because the European alternative to its gas is perceived as a danger that must be confronted strongly.

An arrangement or protocol between Turkey and Libya on maritime boundaries and defense relationships was accepted to reach a compromise between the powers intervening with Libya.

If there is logic for cooperation between regional countries, Libya may constitute a state of stability, however, it is an important source of danger, which makes it an area for international war.

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